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Abstract—Collecting information about user activity in
peer-to-peer systems is a key but challenging task. We de-
scribe here a distributed platform for doing so on the eDon-
key network, relying on a group of honeypot peers which
claim to have certain files and log queries they receive for
these files. We then conduct some measurements with typ-
ical scenarios and use the obtained data to analyze the im-
pact of key parameters like measurement duration, number
of honeypots involved, and number of advertised files. This
illustrates both the possible uses of our measurement sys-
tem, and the kind of data one may collect using it.
Index Terms—peer-to-peer, measurement, honeypot,
eDonkey
I. Introduction.
Peer-to-peer now accounts for the use of 70% or more
of the global internet bandwidth [1], [2]. It is therefore
important to understand the underlying mechanisms, in
order to design efficient protocols. In particular, user be-
haviors and data properties are of high interest: are there
correlations among the files owned by each user? are there
communities of interest? are there sets of similar data or
very popular data? how does data popularity evolve? ...
Much work has been done to answer these questions [3],
[4], [5]. The most widely used approach is to watch the
activity in a network of interest for a period of time. This
raises important difficulties due mainly to the distributed
and anonymous nature of peer-to-peer systems, their dy-
namics, and their sheer size.
This paper explores a new method for collecting infor-
mation on what occurs in one of the main peer-to-peer
systems currently in use, eDonkey 1. It consists in intro-
ducing honeypots in the network, i.e peers pretending to
offer files and logging all the queries they receive for these
files from other peers.
We begin by presenting the current state of the art of
peer-to-peer measurement (Section II), and then we de-
scribe the new solution we propose (Section III). Finally
we will illustrate its relevance with some practical mea-
surements (Section IV), before presenting our conclusions
(Section V).
II. Related work.
Measurement of peer-to-peer systems is a very active
area of research. We focus here on the measurement of
1 eDonkey is a semi-distributed peer-to-peer file exchange system
based on directory servers. An unofficial documentation of the pro-
tocol is available [6].
peer activity, thus ignoring measurements of peer-to-peer
overlays and protocols, which are out of the scope of this
paper. Several approaches have been used to collect in-
formation on peer-to-peer activity, each with its own ad-
vantages and drawbacks. We rapidly describe them in this
section.
A. Measurement at server level.
In centralized or semi-centralized systems (like eDon-
key), queries sent by peers are managed by servers; it is
then possible to passively collect data directly on these
servers. The measurement setting then consists in either
modifying the server so it may log the queries it manages
[7], [8], or capturing traffic at IP level and then decoding
it [9].
This method has the advantage of collecting all the infor-
mation managed by a given server. However, as actual file
exchanges occur between peers (out of the sight of servers),
this information is not captured. Moreover, it requires co-
operation with server administrators.
B. Measurement at peer level.
Passive measurements are also possible in fully dis-
tributed systems at client level: a modified client may ob-
serve the traffic going through it including in some cases
keyword queries, file searches, etc.
In [3], [4], [10], [11] authors set up such measurements.
The main issue of this approach is the need for users
that agree to cooperate, which limits the amount of data
obtained. To increase it, the author of [12] designed a
large distributed architecture called GnuDC (Gnutella Dis-
tributed Crawler); it monitors the network by being at-
tached to a large number of peers.
C. Measurement by client sending queries.
An active measurement method from clients is also pos-
sible. It consists in designing a client that sends queries
in the system and records the obtained answers (lists of
files and providers, typically). This has been done in Nap-
ster [13] and eDonkey [14], [15] with success. The main
drawback of this approach is that it is active: it may inter-
fere with the observations, and the rate at which queries
may be sent is limited.
2D. Measurement at ISP level.
Finally, one may capture peer-to-peer traffic directly on
ISP infrastructures, in a passive way. In [5], [16], [17] for
instance, data is collected from several routers, and differ-
ent peer-to-peer applications (Gnutella, FastTrack, Direct-
Connect, eDonkey) are observed.
This approach provides network-level data, with limited
information on users and exchanged files. This makes
it quite different from other approaches discussed here.
Moreover, it relies on cooperating with ISPs, which have
limited rights to observe user traffic.
III. Our data collection system.
Our measurement infrastructure consists in a set of fake
peers (the honeypots) connected to different servers, and
a manager controlling these honeypots. We first present
our manager and honeypots, and then we discuss privacy
concerns.
A. Manager.
The manager’s role is to set up the honeypots, and then
coordinate them and centralize the data they collect.
The first function of the manager is to launch the hon-
eypots. It specifies to each of them a server to connect to.
Each honeypot then attempts to connect to the server, and
reports its status (connected or not), as well as its clien-
tID 2, if relevant, to the manager. This makes it possible
to re-launch dead honeypots or to redirect them toward
other servers. The manager regularly checks the status of
each honeypot for the same reason.
Several strategies make sense for assigning honeypots
to servers. One may typically choose a different sever for
each honeypot, in order to obtain a more global view. The
choice of servers may also be guided by their resources
and number of users, so that the honeypots may reach the
largest possible number of peers.
The second function of the manager is to tell honey-
pots to advertise fake files. It specifies the name, size and
fileID 3 of each file. Again, many strategies are possible to
choose the files to advertise, and the manager is in charge of
implementing the chosen strategy. For instance, it is pos-
sible to study the activity on a specific topic by choosing
the files accordingly. One may then ask to the discovered
peers their list of shared files and add these files to the the
honeypot’s list. One may also advertise random files.
Finally, the manager periodically gathers the data col-
lected by honeypots and does some basic data management
(for instance, it merges and unifies the collected log files,
see below).
2 In the eDonkey network, peers are identified by a clientID, which
is their IP address if they are directly reachable (high ID) or a 24
bits number otherwise (low ID).
3 In the eDonkey network, files are identified by their fileID or hash.
It is generated from the file’s content, which ensures that two files
with the same content are considered as identical, regardless of their
names.
B. Honeypots.
After receiving an order from the manager to advertise
a file F , the honeypot adds this file to its shared file list.
The eDonkey server then adds the honeypot to its list of
providers for file F . A honeypot may therefore afterward
be contacted by other peers looking for F . Notice that,
due to peer exchange [18] and other high-level eDonkey
features, the honeypot may be contacted by peers which
are not connected to the server.
Each honeypot constructs a log file of all the queries it
receives. The log file can be written directly on a hard disk
or sent via network to the monitor.
Before going any further, we specify that, for each query,
the honeypot saves the information contained in the eDon-
key protocol concerning the message type, as well as meta-
data such as the IP address, port, name, userID 4, version
of client and ID status (high or low) of the peers sending
the queries; moreover, it collects information concerning
the server (name, IP, port), as well as data concerning the
network environment (such as the timestamps marking the
reception of the packets by the system).
Once a peer is connected to a honeypot, the list and
description of all shared files in its cache content are re-
trieved. Note that this feature is not available on all peers,
as it can be disabled by the user.
A honeypot must pass for a normal peer on the network.
For this purpose, we have modified the open-source eDon-
key client Amule [19] so that it meets our needs. We detail
the main modifications below.
File display. In the normal course of events, if a client
has files to offer (the client application considers that
all files belonging to a given directory are files to be
shared with other users), an OFFER-FILES message
describing these files is sent immediately after the con-
nection to the server is established, or whenever the
client’s shared file list changes. This message can also
be used as a keep-alive message, sent periodically to
the server.
As our honeypots do not have any file in their shared
file folder, we have added a module to change the
shared file list, so that the honeypot automatically
sends the desired OFFER-FILES messages to the
server.
Communication with other peers. When a honeypot is
connected to a server and advertises some files, it may
be contacted by other peers wanting to download one
of these files. The normal message exchange process
between a peer wanting to download a file and a peer
having the file is presented in Figure 1. The down-
loading peer tries to establish a connection with a
HELLO message, to which the provider peer answers
with a HELLO-ANSWER message. The download-
ing peer sends a START-UPLOAD query, declaring
which file it is interested in; the provider replies with
4 The user ID (also called user hash) is unique and is used to identify
a client across sessions,however,the client ID is valid only through a
client’s session with a specific server [6].
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an ACCEPT-UPLOAD message. The downloading
peer then starts to query file parts and the provider
sends the queried parts.
Fig. 1
Series of messages exchanged between honeypots and peers.
Our honeypots behave like provider peers up to the
last part of the exchange: they do not send parts of
the desired file to the downloading peer. In this as-
pect, honeypots do therefore not act as normal peers
in the system, and run the risk of being noticed and
then blacklisted. To avoid this, we have implemented
two different strategies for answering file parts queries.
The first one consists in sending nothing: the corre-
sponding honeypots do not reply to file parts queries.
The other strategy consists in sending random content
when queried for file parts.
Log file construction. Our goal is to record users’ activ-
ity concerning the files a honeypot advertises. We
have therefore modified the application to record the
following message types received from other peers:
HELLO, START-UPLOAD, and REQUEST-PART.
C. Privacy concerns
For ethical and legal reasons, we cannot record any sen-
sitive data concerning users’ privacy. In our context, the
main such data are IP addresses and filenames. We want
however to be able to know if a same user requested several
files or not.
In order to attain a high level of anonymisation, while
keeping the anonymised data coherent, we follow a two-
steps procedure. First, each honeypot encodes IP ad-
dresses in its log using a one way hash function, cryp-
tographically sure. This anonymisation takes place before
any data is written to disk or sent to the manager. This
is however not sufficient to achieve a secure anonymisation
of IP addresses: somebody could apply the hash function
to all 232 possible IP addresses, to construct a reverse dic-
tionary of the anonymisation. After having collected the
data from the honeypots, the manager therefore conducts
a second anonymisation step: it replaces each hash value,
in a coherent way between honeypots’ logs, by an integer:
the first hash is replaced by 0, the second one by 1, and so
on. This ensures that the final anonymised data is secure,
and that it is not possible to obtain the users’ IP addresses
from it.
In addition, we also anonymise file names which may
contain personal information [20], [21]. We replace each
word that appears less often than a given threshold by an
integer.
IV. Experiments.
Many parameters may have a strong impact on the mea-
surements conducted with our tool: which files the honey-
pot claims to have; number of honeypots in a distributed
measurement; number of files advertised by the honeypot;
duration of the measurement; etc.
In this section, we study several measurements which
we have conducted to illustrate what is feasible with our
approach and tool, and to investigate the impact of some
key parameters. This relies on two different measurements:
• The distributed measurement used 24 honeypots ran
by different PlanetLab [22] machines during one
month (October 2008). Among the 24 honeypots, half
did not answer at all to queries received from other
peers; the others sent files with random content to
the peers contacting them (see Section B below). All
honeypots advertised the same four files (a movie, a
song, a linux distribution and a text). They were all
connected to the same large server and had a HighID.
• The greedy measurement used only one honeypot but
aimed at advertising as many files as possible. To do
so, the honeypot ran a two-steps procedure: during
the first day of measurement, it asked their list of
shared files to all peers contacting it, and added all
these files to its own list of shared files; after the first
day, it did not increase its list of shared files anymore,
and just recorded the queries it received and the lists
of files shared by peers contacting it. It did not send
any content to other peers. We ran this measurement
during the two first weeks of November 2008.
The key properties of the obtained data are summarized
in Table I. These statistics already show that our mea-
surement method succeeds in collecting large amounts of
data, with hundreds of thousands distinct peers and files
observed.
distributed greedy
Number of honeypots 24 1
Duration in days 32 15
Number of shared files 4 3,175
Number of distinct peers 110,049 871,445
Number of distinct files 28,007 267,047
Space used by distinct files 9 TB 90 TB
TABLE I
Basic statistics regarding the data collected with our
measurements.
In the following, we investigate the impact of four key
parameters of the measurement: its duration; the fact that
honeypots send random content or no content at all; the
4number of honeypots involved; and the number of adver-
tised files.
A. Impact of measurement duration.
Let us first observe how the number of distinct observed
peers evolves as the duration of the measurement grows,
displayed in Figures 2 and 3 for the distributed and greedy
measurements respectively. It appears clearly that the
number of observed peers grows rapidly, and linearily, dur-
ing all the measurement. Even after 30 (resp. 15) days,
the number of distinct peers observed by the distributed
(resp. greedy) measurement still grows significantly: more
than 2,500 (resp. 50,000) new peers per day.
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Fig. 2
Evolution of the number of distinct peers observed during
our distributed measurement (left vertical axis) and
number of new peers observed each day (right vertical axis)
as a function of time elapsed since the beginning of this
measurement, in days (horizontal axis).
These observations are of prime importance for conduct-
ing measurements: they show that conducting very long
measurements is relevant, as one continuously discovers
a significant amount of new peers. They also show that
blacklisting, even if it is present, does not prevent us from
observing many peers despite the fact that our honeypots
never provide any useful content. We deepen this in the
next section.
The number of new peers discovered each day is also dis-
played in Figures 2 and 3. It decreases during time in the
distributed measurement, which is probably due to the fact
that the popularity of shared files decreases. This may also
be due to the fact that we reach a situation where most
peers interested in the files proposed by the honeypot al-
ready have contacted it. In any case, the important point
here is that this happens only after a very long measure-
ment duration (one month), and that even then the num-
ber of new observed peers remains large (more than 2,500
per day). This shows that continuing the measurement for
long periods of time makes sense, even with 24 distributed
honeypots advertising only 4 files. In such a scenario, one
may have guessed that all the peers potentially interested
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Fig. 3
Evolution of the number of distinct peers observed during
our greedy measurement (left vertical axis) and number of
new peers observed each day (right vertical axis) as a
function of time elapsed since the beginning of this
measurement, in days (horizontal axis).
in the proposed files, or most of them, would have been
observed before 30 days. Of course, this depends on the
popularity of the proposed files, but deepening this is out
of the scope of this paper.
One may also notice that the number of peers observed
during the first day of our greedy measurement (Figure 3)
is very low; this is due to the initialisation phase of this
measurement strategy, as described above: during the first
day, the honeypot mainly constructs its large list of shared
files, starting with only a few. The number of observed
peers during this period of time is non-zero, but it is much
smaller than after the initialisation phase and thus it is not
visible on the plot. After this initial period, the honeypot
observes an average of 54,000 new peers each day, which
is stable during the 15 days of measurement.
Finally, we display in Figure 4 the number of queries
we received during each hour of the first week of our dis-
tributed measurement (which is representative of other
weeks and other measurements). After an initial phase
in which our honeypots are not well known in the system
(it lasts 10 minutes before we get our first query), a clear
day-night effect appears. Such an effect reflects a regional
nature of eDonkey activity: if observed users were scat-
tered worldwide, such a day-night phenomenon would not
appear. As these day-night variations follow the European
and North African daily life variations (maximal values are
reached during daytime in these regions and minimal ones
during night), the plot may be seen as a confirmation of the
well known fact that the eDonkey system is most popular
in these regions [23], [24]. This may also be a consequence
of a regional interest for the files proposed by the honey-
pot (for instance, music and movies are subject to such
effects).
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Fig. 4
Number of HELLO messages received each hour during the
first week of our distributed measurements (vertical axis)
as a function of time elapsed since the beginning of the
measurement, in hours (horizontal axis).
B. Random content vs no content.
When contacted by peers wanting an advertised file,
honeypots may apply two different strategies: they may
simply ignore these queries and not answer them; or they
may send random content. These strategies may play an
important role in avoiding blacklisting at server and/or
peer levels: if the system detects that honeypots do not
provide relevant content, then other peers may stop con-
tacting them. We do not consider the strategy consisting
in providing the true files, which would raise bandwidth
and storage problems, as well as legal and ethical issues in
many cases.
In order to investigate this, half the honeypots in our
distributed measurement applied the first strategy, and
half applied the second one. This leads to two groups
of 12 honeypots, which we call no-content and random-
content, respectively. Figures 5 and 6 show the number
of distinct peers sending HELLO and START-UPLOAD
messages (see Figure 1) observed by each group during
our measurement. Similarily, Figure 7 displays the num-
ber of REQUEST-PART messages they received. Similar
plots are obtained for each file advertised by our honeypots,
independently (recall that the honeypots of this measure-
ment setup advertised 4 different files).
All these plots clearly show that, although the difference
is not huge, the random-content strategy leads to better re-
sults than the no-content one. This is particularly striking
regarding the HELLO and START-UPLOAD messages, as
the two strategies behave exactly in the the same up till
this point. This demonstrates that, even though we still
discover many new peers, there is some kind of blacklist-
ing of honeypots, and that this blacklisting is more efficient
when the honeypot sends no content. This is probably due
to the fact that detecting honeypots which send invalid
content takes more time than detecting honeypots which
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Fig. 5
Number of distinct peers sending HELLO messages to our
two groups of honeypots in our distributed measurements
(vertical axis) as a function of time elapsed since the
beginning of measurement, in days (horizontal axis).
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Fig. 6
Number of distinct peers sending START-UPLOAD messages
to our two groups of honeypots in our distributed
measurements (vertical axis) as a function of time elapsed
since the beginning of measurement, in days (horizontal
axis).
send nothing.
The larger difference between strategies regarding the
number of REQUEST-PART messages, as observed in Fig-
ure 7 (we finally observe 1, 9 million queries with the
random-content strategy, and only 1, 5 million with the
no-content strategy), may be explained as follows. First,
when a peer receives irrelevant data or no data from our
honeypots, it may stop using it. Detecting the fact that
the honeypot sends random content is also longer than de-
tecting that it does not answer, and thus a peer may send
queries for more file parts in this case before deciding not
to consider the honeypot anymore. This may be seen as
an implicit blacklisting at client level, which stops using a
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Fig. 7
Number of REQUEST-PART messages received by our two
groups of honeypots in our distributed measurements
(vertical axis) as a function of time elapsed since the
beginning of measurement, in days (horizontal axis).
honeypot after it observed that it sends no useful content.
Finally, these plots show that the random-content strat-
egy is significantly more efficient than the no-content one.
Other blacklisting techniques may operate, but we cannot
observe them with our data.
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Fig. 8
Number of START-UPLOAD messages received from a single
peer by our two groups of honeypots in our distributed
measurements (vertical axis) as a function of time elapsed
since the beginning of measurement, in days (horizontal
axis).
In order to investigate further the difference between the
random-content and no-content strategies, we plot in Fig-
ure 8 (resp. Figure 9) the number of START-UPLOAD
(resp. REQUEST-PART) messages received by our two
groups of honeypots from a single peer. The plot for
HELLO messages is very similar to Figure 8 so we do not
reproduce it here.
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Fig. 9
Number of REQUEST-PART messages received from a single
peer by our two groups of honeypots in our distributed
measurements (vertical axis) as a function of time elapsed
since the beginning of measurement, in days (horizontal
axis).
The peer we have chosen is the one which sent the largest
number of queries to our honeypots. For some periods of
time, it does not send any queries (which induces a plateau
on the plots), but in general this peer sends queries as fast
as it can, provided that the previous query was finished
before it sends the next one.
The fact that it sends significantly less queries to our no-
content honeypots than to our random-content ones con-
firms that the queries which receive no answer are sent at a
lower rate than the ones which receive random content, as
claimed above. This also explains the fact that the plot for
no-content is smoother than the one for random-content,
see Figure 9: the time between two queries to a no-content
honeypot is constant (it is the timeout of the peer waiting
for an answer), while for random-content this time may
vary.
Notice however that this is not sufficient to explain the
difference between the two strategies observed in Figures 5
and 6, as they display the number of distinct peers (not
messages) observed. As explained above, this is certainly
due to a combination of some kind of client-level blacklist-
ing combined to the difference of speed at which a query
is processed when sent to no-content and random-content
honeypots.
C. Impact of the number of honeypots.
Our tools makes it possible to conduct honeypot mea-
surements from a large number of machines at the same
time, in a distributed manner. In this section, we explore
the benefit of this feature: one may imagine that increasing
the number of honeypots does not improve the measure-
ment, at least as soon as a quite small number of honeypots
are in place. The key question we want to address here
therefore is: given a number n of honeypots, what is the
benefit of adding one more honeypot to the infrastructure.
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To investigate this, we use our distributed measurement
involving 24 honeypots, and explore what we would have
seen if only a part of them were used. To do so, we select
n random honeypots among the 24 ones, for n between
0 and 24, and we compute the number of distinct peers
observed by these n honeypots alone. As the choice of the
n honeypots may have a significant influence on the result,
we repeat this computation 100 times (we would ideally
consider all 224 possible subsets of our honeypots, but this
is not feasible), and we plot the average, maximal, and
minimal obtained values, see Figure 10. The averagemakes
it possible to observe what one may expect. The maximal
and minimal values give an indication of the dispersion
of obtained results. In this case, they are quite close to
the average, except at the very beginning of the plot (a
honeypot leads to the observation of as many as 37,000
peers, while another only sees 13,000).
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Fig. 10
Number of distinct peers observed at the end of the
measurement (vertical axis) as a function of the number n
of involved honeypots (horizontal axis). For each n, we
sample 100 random sets of n honeypots and plot the
average, minimal and maximal obtained values.
This plot clearly shows that there is an important ben-
efit in using a few honeypots rather than only one. It
also shows that, even when 24 honeypots are used, there is
a significant benefit in adding more honeypots, thus call-
ing for the use of large-scale distributed infrastructures.
However, the benefit obtained by using more honeypots
progressively decreases. This indicates that, even though
many more honeypots may be used, at some reasonable
point the benefit will become very low. Exploring this fur-
ther requires distributed measurements from many more
machines, which we leave for future work.
D. Impact of the number of files.
A natural way to increase the number of peers observed
by our honeypot measurements is to increase the number of
files we advertise, thus reducing the focus of the measure-
ment. This is the aim of our greedy measurement, which
starts by collecting for one day the list of files shared by
the peers contacting a honeypot, and then adds all these
files to the list of files shared by the honeypot, as described
above.
Similarly to the previous section, we consider a measure-
ment with a given number of files, and then, for any n lower
than or equal to this number, we study the number of peers
we would have observed if we used only n of these files in
our measurement. Here, we could in principle consider the
3,175 files advertised in our measurement. However, this is
not feasible in practice; we therefore consider two subsets
of files: the random-files are a set of 100 randomly chosen
files; and the popular-files are the 100 files for which we
received queries from the largest number of peers.
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Fig. 11
Number of distinct peers observed at the end of the greedy
measurement (vertical axis) as a function of the number n
of advertised files in the random-files set (horizontal axis).
For each n, we sample 100 random sets of n files and plot
the average, minimal and maximal obtained values. In
average, each new file leads to the discovery of
approximately 1,000 new peers.
For these two sets of files, we select n random ones
among the 100 in the set, for n between 0 and 100, and
we compute the number of distinct peers sending queries
for at least one of these files. As the choice of the n files
may have a significant influence on the result, we repeat
this computation 100 times (we would ideally consider all
2100 possible subsets of files, or even the 23175 ones, but
this is not tractable), and we plot the average, maximal,
and minimal obtained values, see Figures 11 and 12.
In both cases, the average, minimal and maximal val-
ues behave similarly, but the difference in the number of
peers observed at the end of the measurement (100,000 for
random-files and 270, 000 for popular-files) clearly shows
that the advertised files have a significant impact on the
obtained data. This is confirmed for any number of files;
in particular, the most popular file leads to the discovery
of 13,373 peers, while some files lead to the observation of
2 peers only.
Importantly, these plots also show that the number of
peers increases significantly and linearily as we add more
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Fig. 12
Number of distinct peers observed at the end of the greedy
measurement (vertical axis) as a function of the number n
of advertised files in the popular-files set (horizontal axis).
For each n, we sample 100 random sets of n files and plot
the average, minimal and maximal obtained values. In
average, each new file leads to the discovery of
approximately 2,700 new peers.
files to our shared files list. This shows that the greedy
approach certainly is relevant if one aims at observing huge
number of peers, and that advertising more than 100 files
definitively is relevant.
V. Conclusion.
We have described a method for peer-to-peer measure-
ment via honeypots and implemented it on the eDonkey
network. This method makes it possible to collect large
amounts of data on peers searching for files. It comple-
ments other approaches and has its own advantages and
drawbacks: it makes it possible to focus on a topic of in-
terest, or even a specific file; it does not require cooperation
with a server administrator and/or an ISP; but it gives a
very partial view; and it may interfere with the systems as
it is active.
We have illustrated the use of our approach by conduct-
ing some measurements which show that it is relevant: it
captures information on many peers and files (hundreds
of thousands) during long periods of time (several weeks),
and using a relatively large number of distributed honey-
pots (24).
Using these measurements, we have evaluated several
strategies and parameters. First, we studied the impact
of measurement duration, and showed that it is useful to
make very long measurements, as we continuously observe
new peers and files. Then we compared the results ob-
tained by sending random content to other peers vs not
answering to their queries; there is no huge difference be-
tween the two, but sending random content is more effi-
cient. We then studied the impact of the number of hon-
eypots involved in a measurement, and the impact of the
number of files they advertise; we showed that increasing
both makes measurements much more efficient in terms of
the number of observed peers and files.
Finally, the global conclusion is that it is relevant to con-
duct large-scale measurements in terms of both duration,
number of involved honeypots, and number of advertised
files. Presented results may also be seen as giving hints in
the setting up of measurements using our infrastructure,
depending on one’s priority and available resources.
The most immediate perspective for future work there-
fore is to conduct measurements at a significantly larger
scale. Another key direction is the design of a measure-
ments targeting specific properties, like for instance being
able to capture all the activity regarding a particular file
or a set of files, and/or a specific keyword. The results
presented here show that this is a difficult task: measure-
ments advertising only 4 files and ran on 24 honeypots
during one month do capture much data, but they do not
reach a steady state.
More generally, designing strategies aimed at capturing
different kinds of information is an important perspective:
which files should honeypots advertise? how should dis-
tributed honeypots be coordinated? how many of them
are necessary? ...
Analysis of the obtained data should also be deepened.
In particular, we plan to explore the relationships between
peers inferred from the fact that they are interested in
the same files, and conversely study relations between files
from the fact that they are downloaded by the same peers.
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